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Introduction 
When John Roberts was nominated to serve as Chief Justice, he 
was asked whether he disproportionately supported business interests 
while serving on the D.C. Circuit.1 According to Roberts, that assertion 
 
†  Brianne J. Gorod is Chief Counsel at the Constitutional Accountability 
Center. This Article draws on the Constitutional Accountability Center’s 
ongoing work tracking the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s success before the 
Roberts Court, located at Corporations and the Supreme Court, 
Constitutional Accountability Center, http://theusconstitution.org/ 
corporations-and-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/L85J-R6XB] (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2017), but the views expressed herein are solely the author's own. 
The author would like to thank the editors of the Case Western Law Review 
for their excellent editorial assistance. 
1. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief 
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 427 (2005), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CHRG-
ROBERTS/pdf/GPO-CHRG-ROBERTS.pdf [https://perma.cc/LC9D-
4CFG] (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (“Duke Law School Professor 
Katherine Fisk examined nine cases heard by you while you have been on 
the court of appeals. Her review concluded that you ruled in favor of a 
business each time. Consequently, she made this prediction: you’re going to 
be a fairly reliable vote against workers’ rights across the board. Would you 
respond to that, please?”). 
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was “wrong.”2 As he explained, “I know that I’ve ruled against 
corporations on a regular basis on the D.C. Circuit. I think I just saw 
a study . . . that suggested I tended to rule against corporations more 
than the average judge. . . . I like to think [my votes] depend[] upon 
the particular law and the particular facts.”3 
Ten years later, one of the most significant debates about the Court 
that Roberts leads is whether it is pro-business, and what it even means 
to be pro-business.4 In this Article, I argue that the answer to the first 
question is yes—both the Roberts Court and John Roberts himself are 
decidedly pro-business. And while that term can have many meanings, 
one of the most important is quite simple: a pro-business Court makes 
it more difficult for individual consumers and employees to hold 
businesses accountable when they violate the law. And that is exactly 
what this Court has too often done, as Justice Elena Kagan acknowl-
edged when she was asked whether the current Court is pro-business. 
As she explained it, the current Court has “made it more difficult for 
injured persons to come to court and to use federal and state law to 
hold business to account for injuries that they’ve done.”5 
Since 2010, my organization, the Constitutional Accountability 
Center, has been studying, as a proxy for the success of business inter-
ests before the Roberts Court, the Chamber of Commerce’s success in 
merits cases in which it participates as either a party or an amicus. The 
results of that analysis are straightforward: the Chamber of Commerce 
has been remarkably successful. Indeed, it appears to have been more 
successful before the Roberts Court than it was before either of the two 
 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 427–28. 
4. Compare Adam Liptak, Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court, 
N.Y. Times (May 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/ 
pro-business-decisions-are-defining-this-supreme-court.html [https://perma 
.cc/S4CG-YY46] (noting that the Roberts Court’s general track record has 
been decidedly pro-business), and Breaking: The Roberts Court Is Extremely 
Pro-Business, The Am. Prospect (Apr. 27, 2011), http://prospect.org/ 
article/breaking-roberts-court-extremely-pro-business [https://perma.cc/ 
E5N9-V427] (pointing out that conservatives on the Roberts Court prefer 
policies favoring business interests), with Jonathan H. Adler, Introduction: 
In Search of the Probusiness Court, in Business and the Roberts Court 
11–12 (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2016) (viewing the Roberts Court’s propensity 
for pro-business decisions as a product of the Court’s unwillingness to “place 
its finger on the scales to assist non-business litigants,” rather than the pro-
duct of an ideological agenda). 
5. Aspen Inst., Is the Roberts Court a Pro-Business Court?, YouTube (June 
30, 2013), http://youtu.be/oevJTy5kmxc [https://perma.cc/TQ24-RBMJ]. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017 
The First Decade of the Roberts Court 
723 
Courts that preceded it.6 After discussing those results, I consider one 
of the most significant implications of that success: the greater difficulty 
individuals face in holding businesses accountable in court when they 
violate the law. Finally, I conclude by providing some thoughts on what 
lies ahead for the Supreme Court and the business docket in the near 
term. 
I. The Chamber’s Success 
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is the “world’s largest business 
organization representing the interests of more than 3 million businesses 
of all sizes, sectors, and regions.”7 The litigation wing of the U.S. Cham-
ber, the National Chamber Litigation Center, is, by its own account, 
“the voice of business in the courts” and regularly files in the Supreme 
Court on issues of interest to the business community, even where no 
business is a party to the case.8 
Since 2010, the Constitutional Accountability Center (CAC) has 
used the Chamber’s success in merits cases at the Court—as either 
party or amicus—as a window into determining how business interests 
have fared before the Roberts Court.9 And at the conclusion of 
Roberts’s first decade on the Court, CAC released a report designed to 
answer just that question based on the data produced by looking at 
every case in which the Chamber participated since Justice Samuel 
 
6. As discussed in greater detail below, CAC’s study did not look at the 
Chamber’s success during the entire Burger and Rehnquist Courts, but in-
stead looked at a multi-year period for each Court in which its membership 
was stable. See infra Part I(A). 
7. About the U.S. Chamber, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, https://www. 
uschamber.com/about-us/about-the-us-chamber [https://perma.cc/C7AR-
9W5T] (last visited Feb. 9, 2017). 
8. U.S. Chamber Litig. Ctr., NCLC Celebrates 30 Years of Advocacy on Behalf 
of the Business Community, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Feb. 27, 2007), 
http://www.chamberlitigation.com/news/releases/nclc-celebrates-30-years-
advocacy-behalf-business-community [https://perma.cc/PA8Y-49FE]. 
9. Tom Donnelly, Constitutional Accountability Ctr., Roberts at 
10: Chief Justice Roberts and Big Business 5 (2015), http:// 
theusconstitution.org/sites/default/files/briefs/Roberts_at_10_10_Busine
ss.pdf [https://perma.cc/AY8M-SQ63] (last visited Feb. 17, 2017). For 
another study of the Chamber’s success before the Court, see David L. 
Franklin, What Kind of Business-Friendly Court? Explaining the Chamber 
of Commerce’s Success at the Roberts Court, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 
1019, 1019–20 (2009) (noting that the Chamber’s success rate at the merits 
stage indicates that the Roberts Court is a business-friendly Court); see also 
id. at 1019 (“[I]n the less than three full Terms of the Roberts Court, the 
Chamber has been not only unusually active but unusually successful at both 
[the certiorari and plenary stages of review].”). 
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Alito joined the Court in early 2006—a universe of 142 cases.10 In that 
same report, CAC also looked at the Chamber’s success over time, thus 
providing a basis for comparing its success before the Roberts Court to 
its success in prior periods. To do that, CAC examined the last five 
terms of the Burger Court, from Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s joining 
the Court in 1981 until Justice Antonin Scalia joined in 1986, as well 
as the last eleven terms of the Rehnquist Court, from the beginning of 
October 1993 until the end of the 2004 October Term in June 2005.11 
To be sure, the results of this study provide only part of the story 
of business at the Roberts Court—they do not, for example, reveal 
anything about the types of questions that the Court is choosing to 
answer, or about the impact of the decisions the Court is reaching. Nor 
do they necessarily capture every single case in which business may 
have an interest. As Jonathan Adler has pointed out, the Chamber “at 
times . . . stays its hand, either because its membership is divided or it 
has determined limited resources are better spent in other cases—
perhaps because the likelihood of winning a given case is too remote,”12 
which means, in his view, that “focusing solely on cases in which the 
Chamber participates may produce an incomplete picture.”13 Nonethe-
less, the Chamber’s success provides at least some indication of how 
business has fared before this Court. Indeed, unless there is some reason 
to think that the Chamber is systematically more likely to participate 
in cases in which it is likely to win now than it was in the past, its 
success over time should provide a good indication of how the Roberts 
Court compares to those that preceded it, as well as how John Roberts 
compares to other Justices, past and present. 
A. The Roberts Court 
CAC’s review of the Chamber’s success before the Court leaves no 
doubt: the Chamber is remarkably successful. As Tom Donnelly wrote 
in the report examining how the Chamber has fared during the first 
 
10. See Donnelly, supra note 9, at 5 (describing CAC’s analysis of the 
Chamber’s success before the Roberts Court). Notably this analysis does not 
consider the Chamber’s success in encouraging the Court to take up certain 
cases, even though there is strong evidence that amicus briefs can be partic-
ularly effective at the certiorari stage. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John 
R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 82 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1109, 1122 (1988) (“Without question, then, 
interested parties can have a significant and positive impact on the Court’s 
agenda by participating as amici curiae prior to the Court’s decision on 
certiorari or jurisdiction.”); see also Franklin, supra note 9, at 1024–25 
(discussing the Chamber’s success at the certiorari stage of litigation). 
11. Donnelly, supra note 9, at 6–7. 
12. Adler, supra note 4, at 4. 
13. Id. at 4–5. 
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decade of the Roberts Court, “a cohesive five-Justice majority on the 
Court . . . has produced victories for the Chamber’s position in the vast 
majority of its cases.”14 Moreover, the Chamber is more successful now 
than it has been in the past. Indeed, the figures are striking. The Cham-
ber enjoyed a sixty-nine percent success rate during the first decade of 
the Roberts Court, a success rate markedly higher than it enjoyed 
during the periods of the Rehnquist and Burger Courts that were also 
studied.15 Strikingly, during the five-year period of the Burger Court 
that was studied, the Chamber won fifteen of thirty-five cases, for a 
winning percentage of only forty-three percent.16 While the Chamber 
fared better during the Rehnquist Court, it still did not perform as well 
as it is currently performing before the Roberts Court; the Chamber’s 
winning percentage during the eleven terms of the Rehnquist Court was 
fifty-six percent, winning forty-five of eighty cases.17 
The cause of the Chamber’s current success is also interesting: the 
Chamber is not benefitting from diverse coalitions of justices supporting 
it in different cases. Rather, there is (as most current Court watchers 
would suspect) a cohesive five justice majority that consistently votes 
for the Chamber. As Donnelly explained, “the members of the Court’s 
conservative majority are tightly bunched in their overall support for 
the Chamber.”18 Indeed, even Justice Anthony Kennedy, the conser-
vative Justice most likely to vote with the Court’s more progressive 
members, voted for the Chamber seventy-two percent of the time, just 
below the Justice with the greatest support for the Chamber (i.e., Jus-
tice Samuel Alito, who voted for the Chamber seventy-four percent of 
the time).19 
This is not to say, of course, that the Court’s conservative and 
relatively progressive Justices never see eye to eye on cases in which 
the Chamber has an interest. After all, the Court’s more progressive 
justices collectively “cast nearly half of their votes (47%) in favor of the 
Chamber’s position.”20 And many decisions are not divided along ideo-
logical lines, with the Court finding it relatively easy to reach a consen-
sus on the outcome.”21 Yet in the twenty-nine percent of cases that 
sharply divided the Court (i.e., those decided 5–4 or 5–3), the 
 
14. Donnelly, supra note 9, at 5. 
15. Id. at 6. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 7. 
18. Id. at 5–6. 
19. Id. at 6. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
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ideological divide between the Justices is evident.22 In the forty-one 
Chamber cases decided by just one or two votes, eighty percent were 
Chamber victories, and in those cases, the conservatives collectively 
voted for the Chamber seventy-nine percent of the time, while the 
Court’s relatively progressive members only did so twenty-two percent 
of the time.23 Interestingly, the ideological division during the last five 
terms of the Burger Court was not nearly as strong—then, there was 
only a twelve point divide between conservatives and liberals (49% to 
37%), not the twenty-four point difference in support for the Chamber’s 
position that exists now.24 Likewise, during the Rehnquist Court, the 
difference in support between the Court’s conservatives and its more 
liberal members was only thirteen points (61% to 48%).25 
Significantly, these conclusions are consistent with a comprehensive 
study of business’s success before the Roberts Court conducted by Lee 
Epstein, William Landes, and Judge Richard Posner.26 As part of their 
study, they looked at all Supreme Court cases decided between October 
Term 1946 and October Term 2011 in which a business was a party on 
only one side of the case.27 Based on their examination of those cases—
1,759 in total—they concluded that the Roberts Court was “much 
friendlier to business than either the Burger or Rehnquist Courts.”28 
B. John Roberts 
That John Roberts is leading the most pro-business Supreme Court 
in the modern era is perhaps unsurprising: according to CAC’s research 
on the Chamber’s success, John Roberts himself votes for business inter-
ests far more often than he does not.29 According to CAC’s report, 
Roberts votes for the Chamber’s position in seventy percent of all cases, 
making him the fourth most supportive Justice on the Court as of 
2015.30 Interestingly, his support for the Chamber climbed even 
higher—to eighty-three percent—in closely divided cases (second only 
 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 7. 
26. See Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 Minn. 
L. Rev. 1431, 1433 (2013) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s “pro- and anti-
business decisions” relative to the ideological divide and individual voting 
behavior of the Justices). 
27. Id. at 1434. 
28. Id. at 1472. 
29. Donnelly, supra note 9, at 8. 
30. Id. 
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to Justice Alito in his support for the Chamber).31 This is consistent 
with Epstein, Landes, and Posner’s study, which concluded that all five 
of the conservatives on the Roberts Court would appear on a list of the 
ten most pro-business Justices since 1946, and that Justices Alito and 
Roberts would rank at the very top.32 
It is worth noting that, as those numbers reflect, Roberts does not 
always vote in favor of the Chamber’s position.33 Indeed, there are even 
some Chamber cases in which Roberts has parted ways with some of 
his fellow conservatives. For example, he joined the Court’s more pro-
gressive members in rejecting the business community’s efforts to weak-
en the federal law prohibiting pregnancy discrimination,34 and he also 
voted with Justice Kennedy and the Court’s more progressive members 
to uphold EPA regulations designed to address interstate air pollution.35 
But, as the numbers also reflect, the Chief Justice votes for the Cham-
ber’s position far more often than he does not, and he has done so on a 
wide variety of issues.36 
 
31. Id. The conservative Justices’ voting records were highly concentrated 
overall, ranging from just 69.5% to 73.6%, but were slightly more spread 
out in the closely divided cases, ranging from 70.7% to 87.5%. Id. 
32. Epstein et al., supra note 26, at 1449. Alito and Roberts ranked first and 
second for all cases, and first and third for 5–4 decisions. Id. 
33. Donnelly, supra note 9, at 8. 
34. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). 
35. EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). Although 
the Chief Justice also famously parted ways with his fellow conservatives in 
upholding the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate, Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), the Chamber did not file a brief 
on the constitutionality of the mandate. Instead, it filed only on the separate 
question whether the mandate was severable from the remainder of the law. 
Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Reversal as to the Severability Issue, Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-393). 
36. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) 
(establishing what constitutes a timely filing for EEOC complaints related 
to sex-based pay discrimination); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010) (holding unconstitutional a federal law that prohibited “corporations 
and unions from using their general treasury funds” to engage in political 
speech); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) 
(holding that “a contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable under 
the Federal Arbitration Act when the plaintiff's cost of individually arbi-
trating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery”); Michigan 
v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (holding that the EPA must consider the 
costs of compliance when deciding what to regulate under the Clean Air 
Act); Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (holding federal 
law preempted a design defect claim against a pharmaceutical company for 
injuries caused by a generic drug). 
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Interestingly, while Roberts may have developed a record as one of 
the most pro-business Justices in recent history, he hasn’t led the charge 
through written opinions. Indeed, in his first decade on the Court, he 
wrote only four majority opinions in the Chamber’s cases, and most of 
those were in relatively low-profile cases.37 Indeed, in perhaps the high-
est profile majority opinion written by the Chief Justice in a Chamber 
case, Roberts made the classic Roberts move, giving the business com-
munity some, but not all, of what it wanted. As Donnelly described it, 
the “opinion is quintessential John Roberts—a model for his preferred 
method of moving the law.”38 
In Halliburton Co. v. Erica B. John Fund,39 the Court was asked 
whether to overrule a 1988 decision, which made it easier for investors 
who bought stock based on materially misleading information to bring 
class actions.40 Had the Court done so, it would have been “one of the 
most important business-law cases of the decade.”41 But the Court 
didn’t do so: Chief Justice Roberts put together a six-Justice majority 
in favor of a result that didn’t overrule Basic, but still made it easier 
for businesses to challenge securities class actions at the class certifica-
tion stage.42 In other words, he moved the law in his desired direction, 
while adopting a posture of restraint, especially as compared to Justices 
Thomas, Scalia, and Alito, who would have overruled Basic.43 
In sum, in the first decade of his tenure as Chief Justice, Roberts—
like the Court he leads—has had a decidedly pro-business record, as 
reflected in his votes in support of the Chamber of Commerce’s position 
in merits cases. The consequences of this pro-business shift have been 
 
37. Donnelly, supra note 9, at 9. He also wrote a number of concurrences 
and dissents. See id. at 9–11 (discussing those opinions). 
38. Id. at 11. 
39. 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
40. The Court’s 1988 decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson had allowed investors 
to proceed as a class on the presumption that “anyone who buys or sells 
the stock at the market price may be considered to have relied on those 
misstatements.” Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2405 (discussing Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)). 
41. Ronald Mann, Argument Recap: Justices Not Quite Ready to Jettison 
Landmark Securities Decision, Seeking Middle Ground, SCOTUSBlog 
(Mar. 7, 2014, 4:45 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/03/argument-
recap-justices-not-quite-ready-to-jettison-landmark-securities-decision-seeking-
middle-ground/ [https://perma.cc/2Q4D-FKAY]. 
42. Donnelly, supra note 9, at 12. 
43. Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2418 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Logic, economic 
realities, and our subsequent jurisprudence have undermined the foundations 
of the Basic presumption, and stare decisis cannot prop up the façade that 
remains. Basic should be overruled.”). 
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significant in a number of different ways, but perhaps the most signifi-
cant is the extent to which it has made it more difficult for individuals 
to hold businesses accountable when they violate the law, as I discuss 
in the next Part. 
II. The Pro-Business Court: What It Means 
A. Class Actions 
When the Framers drafted the Constitution, they departed from 
the Articles of Confederation that then governed the fledging nation in 
a number of respects. One of the most significant of these was to 
establish the judiciary as an independent, co-equal branch of govern-
ment.44 In doing so, the Framers sought to ensure that federal courts 
would have the power to protect individual rights secured by federal 
law.45 Well-steeped in English common law, the Framers strongly be-
lieved that for each legal right there is a legal remedy46—and the new 
federal courts were to be the forum in which injured parties could seek 
redress when their legal rights were violated.47 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which allows a representative 
party to sue on behalf of a class of similarly situated claimants where 
certain specified conditions are met,48 was designed, in part, to help 
ensure that the Framers’ vision for the federal courts was realized. By 
ensuring that injured parties can seek redress in the federal courts even 
when their individual claims are too small to make individual litigation 
economically feasible, the Rule helps ensure that the federal courts 
really are a forum in which all legal wrongs can be remedied.49 
 
44. David H. Gans, Constitutional Accountability Ctr., The 
Keystone of the Arch: The Text and History of Article III and 
the Constitution’s Promise of Access to Courts 5 (2016), http:// 
theusconstitution.org/sites/default/files/Keystone_of_the_Arch.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/F4PV-5G6K]. 
45. Id. at 7. 
46. Id. at 13–14; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) 
(“[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, 
there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is 
invaded.”) (quoting 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *23). 
47. Gans, supra note 44, at 14. 
48. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (requiring numerosity, commonality, typicality, and 
adequate representation as threshold prerequisites for any class). 
49. See, e.g., John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23—What Were 
We Thinking?, 24 Miss. C. L. Rev. 323, 336–37 (2005) (explaining that the 
rule was amended in 1966 to “create a procedural vehicle capable of . . . 
‘enabling small people with small claims to vindicate their rights when they 
could not otherwise do so’”) (quoting Memorandum from the Advisory 
Comm. on Civil Rules to the Chairman and Members of the Standing 
Comm. on Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., 
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Despite the important role served by the Rule 23 class action, the 
Roberts Court has, on the whole, made it more difficult to bring class 
actions. Perhaps the most significant example of the Roberts Court’s 
antipathy to the class action device is Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Duke,50 
in which the Court held, 5–4, that female employees who alleged they 
had been the victims of sex discrimination could not bring a class 
action.51 According to the Court, the plaintiffs did not satisfy the “com-
monality” requirement of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that is, 
the requirement that there be “questions of law or fact common to the 
class.”52 As the Court explained:  
[T]he only corporate policy that the plaintiffs’ evidence con-
vincingly establishes is [the employer’s] “policy” of allowing 
discretion by local supervisors over employment matters. On its 
face, of course, that is just the opposite of a uniform employment 
practice that would provide the commonality needed for a class 
action; it is a policy against having uniform employment 
practices.53 
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg disagreed sharply with the Court’s 
majority, noting that the Court gave “no credence to the key dispute 
common to the class: whether Wal-Mart’s discretionary pay and pro-
motion policies are discriminatory.”54 She also discussed workplace 
realities that the Court’s majority ignored, arguing that the Court’s 
decision would prevent women from redressing “[t]he practice of dele-
gating to supervisors large discretion [that] . . . has long been known to 
have the potential to produce disparate effects,” and that the “risk of 
discrimination is heightened when those managers are predominantly 
of one sex, and are steeped in a corporate culture that perpetuates 
gender stereotypes.”55 
Two years later, the Court issued another class action decision that 
made it more difficult for individuals to bring class actions. In Comcast 
 
Summary Statement of the Civil Rules Amendments Recommended for 
Adoption 7 (June 10, 1965), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ 
fr_import/CV06-1965.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TTG-M72S]). 
50. 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
51. Id.  
52. Id. at 349 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)). The Court also held that 
another aspect of plaintiffs’ claims was improperly certified under a different 
provision of Rule 23, id. at 360, but the dissenters agreed with the majority on 
that point. Id. at 367–68 (Ginsberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
53. Id. at 355. 
54. Id. at 374 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
55. Id. at 372–73 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Corp. v. Behrend,56 the Court held, again 5–4, that current and former 
Comcast subscribers could not seek damages from Comcast for alleged 
violations of the federal antitrust laws because they had not shown that 
damages could be measured on a classwide basis.57 The dissenters on 
the Court not only disagreed with the Court on the merits,58 but again 
faulted the majority for having decided the case at all.59 
To be sure, there have been a couple of class action decisions that 
did not go business’s way. In Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez,60 the Court 
held, 6–3, that a defendant cannot moot a plaintiff’s case by making an 
offer of judgment that the plaintiff does not accept.61 That same term, 
in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,62 the Court held, 6–2, that plain-
tiffs can use “a representative sample to fill an evidentiary gap created 
by the employer’s failure to keep adequate records.”63 While both cases 
were losses for the business community, they reflect as much as any-
thing else overreach by the business community. In Tyson Foods, for 
example, the Court needed only to rely on a long-standing precedent to 
reach its decision.64 
In sum, while not every decision by the Roberts Court has been 
pro-business, there have been enough significant decisions that have 
been that it is now more difficult to bring a class action than it used to 
 
56. 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
57. Id.  
58. Id. at 1437 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (“Incautiously entering the 
fray at this interlocutory stage, the Court sets forth a profoundly mistaken 
view of antitrust law. And in doing so, it relies on its own version of the 
facts, a version inconsistent with factual findings made by the District Court 
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.”). 
59. Id. at 1435 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (“This case comes to the 
Court infected by our misguided reformulation of the question presented. 
For that reason alone, we would dismiss the writ of certiorari as 
improvidently granted.”); id. at 1437 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) 
(“The oddity of this case, in which the need to prove damages on a classwide 
basis through a common methodology was never challenged by respondents, 
is a further reason to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.” (citation 
omitted)). 
60. 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016). 
61. The Court made explicit, however, that it “need not . . . decide whether 
the result would be different if a defendant deposits the full amount of the 
plaintiff’s individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the 
court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount.” Id. at 672. 
62. 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016). 
63. Id. at 1047.  
64. Id. at 1047 (“This Court’s decision in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens[, 328 U.S. 
680 (1946),] explains why [the expert’s] sample was permissible in the 
circumstances of this case.”). 
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be.65 And that, in turn, makes it more difficult for individuals to have 
their day in court and hold businesses accountable when they violate 
the law. 
B. Arbitration 
The Constitution guarantees a right to jury trial,66 but increasingly 
in recent years, individuals who have tried to sue to redress injuries 
they have suffered have found themselves barred from going to court 
and forced to arbitrate instead. The Federal Arbitration Act, which 
provides that written arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irre-
vocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract,”67 was passed in 1925 in re-
sponse to Supreme Court “hostility” toward private arbitration agree-
ments;68 nearly a century later, a Court favorably disposed toward such 
agreements has used the FAA to expand arbitration and limit access to 
the courts. Although this trend began in the 1980s,69 it is one that has 
continued consistently during the Roberts Court. 
Two of the Court’s significant arbitration decisions came in 2010. 
In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds International Corp.,70 the Court 
held, 5–3, that “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit 
to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding 
that the party agreed to do so.”71 In other words, the Court made it 
more difficult for individuals to bring class claims in an arbitral forum. 
According to Justice Ginsburg, the Court’s decision was wrong, 
“allowing [the defendant] essentially to repudiate its submission of the 
contract-construction issue to the arbitration panel, and to gain, in 
 
65. See, e.g., Georgene Vairo, Symposium, Is the Class Action Really Dead? Is 
That Good or Bad for Class Members?, 64 Emory L.J. 477, 479 (2014) (“It 
is no secret that the United States Supreme Court has made obtaining class 
certification and group dispute resolution more difficult.”); Brandon L. 
Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
593, 594 (2012) (“One reason is that class actions seeking group-based civil 
rights remedies may be difficult to bring. This is no surprise to observers of 
the Supreme Court’s recent class action decisions . . . .”). 
66. U.S. Const. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved . . . .”). 
67. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
68. J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 
124 Yale L.J. 3052, 3059–60 (2015) (citations omitted). 
69. See id. at 3061 (“[T]he Supreme Court abandoned its prior skepticism re-
garding arbitration of federal claims and held that arbitration agreements 
could be enforced with respect to a broad range of federal statutes . . . .”).  
70.  559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
71. Id. at 684. 
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place of the arbitrators’ judgment, [the Supreme Court’s] de novo deter-
mination.”72 She also recognized the real-world consequences the decis-
ion would have. As Justice Ginsburg explained: “When adjudication is 
costly and individual claims are no more than modest in size, class 
proceedings may be ‘the thing,’ i.e., without them, potential claimants 
will have little, if any, incentive to seek vindication of their rights.”73 
In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,74 the Court held, 5-4, that 
a litigant who challenges the validity of an arbitration agreement can-
not bring that challenge in court unless he has objected to the specific 
line in the arbitration agreement that purports to assign such challenges 
to the arbitrator.75 In other words, even if an individual believes an 
arbitration agreement is invalid under state law, he must arbitrate that 
challenge. Thus, the result of the Court’s decision was to make it more 
difficult for individuals to bring all kinds of claims in court where they 
have signed an arbitration agreement, even if that agreement is invalid. 
What made the Court’s decision all the more stunning was that, as 
Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, neither party “urged [the Court] 
to adopt the rule the Court does today.”76 
The next year the Court doubled down on its opposition to class 
claims in arbitral forums, holding, again 5–4, that a state could not 
“condition[] the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the 
availability of classwide arbitration procedures.”77 Thus, California’s 
rule requiring that classwide arbitration procedures be available was 
preempted by the FAA.78 As Justice Breyer explained in dissent, class 
arbitration was not only “consistent with the use of arbitration,” it was 
also a “form of arbitration that is well known in California and followed 
elsewhere.”79 He also made the same point about the importance of class 
proceedings that Justice Ginsburg did: “agreements that forbid the 
consolidation of claims can lead small-dollar claimants to abandon their 
claims rather than to litigate.”80 
Finally, in 2013, the Court again made clear that, in its view, there 
was no exception to its staunch opposition to class claims in arbitral 
 
72. Id. at 693 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
73. Id. at 699 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“[D]isallowance of class proceedings severely shrinks the dimensions of the 
case or controversy a claimant can mount . . . .”). 
74. 561 U.S. 63 (2010). 
75. Id.  
76. Id. at 76 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
77. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336 (2011). 
78. Id. at 352. 
79. Id. at 361 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
80. Id. at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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forums. In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,81 the 
Court held, yet again 5–3, that a contractual waiver of class arbitration 
was enforceable even if the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating his 
claim was greater than the maximum amount he could hope to reco-
ver.82 According to the majority, “the fact that it is not worth the ex-
pense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the 
elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”83 
As Justice Kagan explained in dissent, “if the [contract’s] arbitra-
tion clause is enforceable, Amex has insulated itself from antitrust 
liability—even if it has in fact violated the law.”84 She then gave the 
Court’s majority credit for not hiding its attitude about that result: 
“here is the nutshell version of today’s opinion, admirably flaunted ra-
ther than camouflaged: Too darn bad.”85 She went on: “[t]o a hammer, 
everything looks like a nail. And to a Court bent on diminishing the 
usefulness of Rule 23, everything looks like a class action, ready to be 
dismantled.”86 
In short, during the first decade of the Roberts Court, the Court—
with Chief Justice Roberts on board every step of the way—has 
consistently made it more likely that individuals will have to arbitrate 
rather than have their day in court, and it has limited the ability of 
injured parties forced into arbitral parties to vindicate their rights 
there. 
What does this trend mean? While a full discussion of the conse-
quences of this shift is beyond the scope of this Article, there is a rich 
literature that describes the numerous ways in which this shift has 
harmed injured individuals, as well as the legal system. David Schwartz, 
for example, has written that “displacing adjudication through pre-
dispute arbitration clauses systematically reduces the legal liability of 
corporate defendants.”87 And Maria Glover has explained that by 
“handing this quasi-lawmaking power to private parties and by reduc-
ing substantive statutory rights to mere formalities—to little more than 
empty rights—the Court has eroded the substantive law itself.”88 
 
81. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
82. Id.  
83. Id. at 2311. 
84. Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
85. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
86. Id. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
87. David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee 
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. 
L. Rev. 33, 37 (1997). 
88. Glover, supra note 68, at 3059. 
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C. Preemption 
Another area in which the Roberts Court, while not always pro-
business, has markedly shifted the law in a pro-business direction is 
preemption. The Supremacy Clause provides that “[t]his Constitution, 
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”89 It is well-
established that where state law conflicts with federal law, that state 
law is preempted by the federal law.90 There has been considerable 
controversy, however, over when and how courts should determine 
whether a state law is preempted by federal law. 
One of the biggest Chamber losses before the Roberts Court was in 
Wyeth v. Levine,91 a case about a plaintiff’s state-law claim that the 
warning label of a drug she had received was insufficient.92 The Court, 
6–3, held that the plaintiff’s state law claim was not preempted.93 
According to the Court’s majority (Justice Kennedy joined the Court’s 
more progressive members, and Justice Thomas concurred in the judg-
ment), the “manufacturer bears responsibility for the content of its label 
at all times” because nothing in federal law prohibited manufacturers 
from strengthening their warning labels even before receiving FDA 
approval.94 In reaching this result, the majority applied a presumption 
against preemption,95 and also rejected the notion that state consumer 
laws posed an obstacle to the federal regulatory scheme.96 As the Court 
explained, “the FDA long maintained that state law offers an 
additional, and important, layer of consumer protection that comple-
ments FDA regulation.”97 To the dissenters, the Court’s view imper-
missibly sent mixed messages to businesses like Wyeth: “The FDA told 
Wyeth that [the manufacturer] label renders its use ‘safe.’ But the State 
of Vermont, through its tort law, said: ‘Not so.’”98 
 
89. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
90. See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 617 (2011) (“Where state 
and federal law ‘directly conflict,’ state law must give way.” (citation 
omitted)). 
91. 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
92. Id.  
93. Id. at 581. 
94. Id. at 570–71. 
95. Id. at 565 n.3. 
96. Id. at 573. 
97. Id. at 579. 
98. Id. at 628 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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Two years later, the Court took a different path on preemption. In 
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,99 the Court, this time 5–4, held that the in-
jured plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims were preempted by federal drug 
laws.100 According to the Court’s majority, even though Wyeth held 
that federal drug laws did not preempt state consumer safety laws when 
it came to brand-name drugs, the same did not hold true with respect 
to generic drugs; rather, with respect to generics, so long as the manu-
facturer complied with federal law, an injured party could not sue under 
state tort law.101 In the Court’s view, federal law limits a generic drug 
manufacturer’s authority to unilaterally change its label to address 
newly discovered risks.102 
But as the dissenters pointed out, even though generic drug manu-
facturers cannot unilaterally change their labels, they can—and must—
approach the FDA to seek to revise a drug’s label when they have re-
asonable evidence of a serious problem with the drug.103 Thus, “federal 
law affords generic manufacturers a mechanism for attempting to 
comply with their state-law duties to warn, . . . [and] does not categori-
cally pre-empt state-law failure-to-warn claims against generic manu-
facturers.”104 In dissent, Justice Sotomayor also noted the “absurd con-
sequences” of the Court’s ruling—namely, that a consumer’s rights to 
sue a drug manufacturer under state law over an inadequately labeled 
drug would turn on whether the pharmacist filled it with a brand name 
or a generic.105 
Two years later, the Court’s conservative majority again made it 
more difficult for individuals to bring state law claims for injuries 
caused by a generic drug. In that case, the plaintiff suffered rare (but 
known) side-effects of a generic drug she was taking for shoulder pain: 
the drug “caused two-thirds of her skin to slough off, damag[ing] her 
lungs and esophagus and render[ing] her legally blind.”106 She was 
 
99. 564 U.S. 604 (2011). 
100. Notably, the Chamber did not participate in this case. Summary of PLIVA, 
Inc. v. Mensing, SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/ 
cases/pliva-inc-v-mensing/ [https://perma.cc/YVH4-SN4R] (last visited Feb. 
18, 2017). 
101. See PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 626 (“It is beyond dispute that the federal statutes 
and regulations that apply to brand-name drug manufacturers are meaning-
fully different than those that apply to generic drug manufacturers.”). 
102. Id. at 613–15. 
103. Id. at 631–32 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
104. Id. at 645 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
105. Id. at 643 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
106. Adam Liptak, Justices Explore Fine Line on Generic Drug Injuries, N.Y. 
Times (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/20/business/ 
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awarded a $21 million verdict by a New Hampshire jury.107 According 
to the Court’s majority, PLIVA controlled, and the plaintiff’s claim was 
preempted.108 In dissent, Justice Sotomayor explained why the Court’s 
decision was at odds with precedent and noted that “the Court has left 
a seriously injured consumer without any remedy despite Congress’ ex-
plicit efforts to preserve state common-law liability.”109 
Thus, as others have noted, “by siding with the business com-
munity, Chief Justice Roberts and his conservative colleagues closed 
the courthouse doors to certain patients who have been severely injured 
by generic drugs.”110 And several members of the Court, including the 
Chief Justice, would have “gone even further, eliminating these state-
law claims even in the case of brand-name drugs.”111 
III. Looking Ahead 
Ever since the 2016 election results came in, there has been a lot of 
talk about what those results will mean for the Supreme Court. In the 
short term, the answer seems clear: a return to the Court that existed 
before Justice Antonin Scalia passed away, namely, one that is very 
conservative, but in which some progressive victories are possible.112 
What that means with respect to the Court’s business docket, in 
particular, is that despite Donald Trump’s populist campaign rhe-
toric,113 the Supreme Court will likely remain decidedly pro-
business114—to the detriment of consumers and employees who are 
seeking to ensure that businesses comply with the law. 
 
justices-explore-fine-line-on-generic-drug-injuries.html [https://perma.cc/ 
9BEX-J4EW]. 
107. Id. 
108. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2013). 
109. Id. at 2496 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer wrote a separate 
dissent, explaining why he could not “give special weight to the FDA’s 
views.” Id. at 2481 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
110. Donnelly, supra note 9, at 17–18. 
111. Id. at 18. 
112. See Jonathan H. Adler, Business and the Roberts Court Without Scalia, 
Wash. Post (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/09/21/business-and-the-roberts-court-without-
scalia/ [https://perma.cc/WMV7-8BA8] (describing the Supreme Court’s 
future concerning business decisions without Justice Scalia on the bench). 
113. See, e.g., Geoff Dyer et al., Trump and Clinton Focus Frantic Final Push on 
Battleground States, Fin. Times (Nov. 6, 2016), http://www.ft.com/ 
content/1d69272a-a446-11e6-8898-79a99e2a4de6 [https://perma.cc/R5CN-
UGBD] (discussing Trump’s campaign rhetoric). 
114. Cf. Judith E. Schaeffer, Constitutional Accountability Ctr., 
Supreme Court Nominee Neil Gorsuch: Expected by Big Business 
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Notably, the Supreme Court has not had to wait long before re-
turning to issues like class actions and arbitration. Currently on the 
Court’s merits docket, for example, is Microsoft Corp. v. Baker.115 Al-
though the Court granted cert in the case in January 2016,116 the Court 
did not hold oral argument until March 2017. The question in the case 
is “whether a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction to review an order 
denying class certification after the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss 
their claims with prejudice.”117 Although the Court had not yet issued 
an opinion in this case as of the time this Article went to print, post-
argument commentary suggests that this case is likely to represent a 
win for business.118 
To be sure, this case will not decide issues at the heart of the Rule 
23 class action, but it is nonetheless important; the Chamber of 
Commerce urged the Court to hear the case, explaining that “the Ninth 
Circuit has allowed class-action plaintiffs to take immediate appeals of 
orders denying class certification even in cases where the requirements 
for interlocutory appeals . . . have not been met. The Chamber and its 
members have an interest in seeing this practice end.”119 But as others 
have argued in merits briefs before the Court, the Supreme Court’s own 
precedents “ensure that, when a district court erroneously denies class 
certification, the court of appeals is able to review and reverse that 
denial, regardless of whether the passage of time, acts of defendants, or 
impracticalities of litigating small claims lead to the final termination 
of the named plaintiffs’ individual claims.”120  
 
to be Another Reliable Vote on the Roberts Court 1 (2017), 
http://theusconstitution.org/sites/default/files/CAC-Gorsuch-And-Business 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/XNG9-LN8G] (explaining that “[a]dvocates for 
business interests . . . proclaim[ed] the Gorsuch nomination a big win for 
corporate America”). 
115. Summary of Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, SCOTUSblog, http://www. 
scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/microsoft-corp-v-baker/ [https://perma.cc/ 
37RK-DA3N] (last visited Feb. 19, 2017). 
116. Id. 
117. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 136 S. Ct. 890 
(2015) (No. 15-457). 
118. Ronald Mann, Argument Analysis: Justices Dubious about Free Review of 
Decisions Denying Class Certification, SCOTUSblog (Mar. 21, 2017), http: 
//www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/argument-analysis-justices-dubious-free-
review-decisions-denying-class-certification/ [https://perma.cc/D2RD-CZ7J]. 
119. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 136 
S. Ct. 890 (No. 15-457) (Nov. 12, 2015). 
120. Brief of Public Citizen, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 
3, Microsoft v. Baker, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016) (No. 15-457). See also id. (“The 
Court’s precedents help make certain that a district court’s erroneous denial 
of class certification does not irrevocably deprive the courts of the efficiency 
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The Supreme Court also recently decided to hear three cases, all of 
which raise the question whether an employer can force an employee to 
resolve employment-related disputes through individual arbitration and 
waive class proceedings. As two courts of appeals have concluded, such 
agreements violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),121 which 
provides that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to 
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid 
or protection,”122 and then makes it an “unfair labor practice for an 
employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the 
exercise of the” aforementioned rights.123 According to these courts, the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not preempt the NLRA because of 
the FAA’s savings clause, which, as the Supreme Court has recognized, 
“permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by ‘generally appli-
cable contract defenses.’”124 As these courts explain, illegality is such a 
defense.125 One court of appeals came out the other way, relying on a 
prior opinion of that court which held that the “‘use of class action 
procedures . . . is not a substantive right’” under the NLRA.126 It is too 
early to know what the Supreme Court will do, but if it holds that these 
agreements are valid, it will make it that much more difficult for 
employees to hold their employers accountable if they try to violate the 
law. 
Finally, there will no doubt be other significant issues affecting 
business on the Court’s docket in the near term. One of the biggest may 
be the continuing validity and scope of doctrines of administrative 
 
and economy of scale served by the class-action device or keep plaintiffs with 
meritorious claims from being able to join together to vindicate their rights.”). 
121. Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that 
an employer who requires its employees to sign an agreement that precludes 
them from bringing a legal claim in any forum regarding working conditions 
violates the National Labor Relations Act); Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 
F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that requiring employees to bring wage-
and-hour claims through individual arbitration violated the National Labor 
Relations Act and the Federal Arbitration Act). 
122. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
123. Id. § 158(a)(1). 
124. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (quoting 
Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)). 
125. Morris, 834 F.3d at 988 (“[B]ecause a substantive federal right is waived by 
the contract . . . it is accurate to characterize its terms as ‘illegal.’”); Lewis, 
823 F.3d at 1159 (“Illegality is a standard contract defense contemplated by 
the FAA’s saving clause.”). 
126. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1016 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(quoting D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 357 (5th Cir. 2013)). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017 
The First Decade of the Roberts Court 
740 
deference, which provide that where statutes are ambiguous, courts 
should defer to reasonable interpretations of the agencies charged with 
interpreting them.127 A related doctrine provides that courts should also 
defer to agencies’ reasonable construction of their own regulations.128 
Conservatives have long questioned these doctrines. Chief Justice 
John Roberts has been at the forefront of these efforts, making clear his 
disdain for the administrative state and Chevron. For example, dissen-
ting in a case in which the majority applied Chevron deference, the 
Chief Justice wrote that “[t]he Framers could hardly have envisioned 
today’s ‘vast and varied federal bureaucracy’ and the authority admin-
istrative agencies now hold over our economic, social, and political 
activities. . . . ‘[T]he administrative state with its reams of regulations 
would leave them rubbing their eyes.’”129 In that opinion, Roberts made 
clear his distaste for Chevron deference, noting that “Chevron is a 
powerful weapon in an agency’s regulatory arsenal” because it means 
agency interpretations often have “the full force and effect of law.”130 
He went on: “It would be a bit much to describe the result as ‘the very 
definition of tyranny,’ but the danger posed by the growing power of 
the administrative state cannot be dismissed.”131 To the Chief Justice 
(and Justices Kennedy and Alito who joined his dissent), it was in-
appropriate to accord the agency interpretation at issue in that case 
Chevron deference. According to Justice Scalia, who wrote for the 
Court, the Chief Justice’s approach would have resulted in a “massive 
revision of [the Court’s] Chevron jurisprudence.”132 
More recently, in King v. Burwell,133 Chief Justice Roberts similarly 
took aim at Chevron. In that case, Roberts acknowledged that courts 
 
127. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). 
128. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997). 
129. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight 
Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010) and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 807 (1999) 
(Souter, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 1879 (noting the “hundreds of federal 
agencies poking into every nook and cranny of daily life”). 
130. Id. at 1879. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 1874. Justice Thomas has also questioned Chevron deference. See, e.g., 
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(stating that the EPA’s “request for deference raises serious questions about 
the constitutionality of our broader practice of deferring to agency interpre-
tations of federal statutes”). 
133. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
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will normally apply Chevron when considering an agency’s interpre-
tation of a statute.134 But, Roberts cautioned, “‘[i]n extraordinary cases 
. . . there may be reason to hesitate before [applying Chevron].’”135 
According to the Court, King was “one of those cases” because the 
question at issue was one “of deep ‘economic and political significance’ 
that is central to [the] statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign 
that question to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly.”136 
This view, if applied in the future, could create a major hole in the long-
standing doctrine of Chevron deference.137 It’s not difficult to imagine 
the Court soon taking up cases that could give it the opportunity to 
further define these doctrines, which in turn will affect how readily 
agencies can regulate business.138 
Conclusion 
Over ten years ago, there was debate about whether John Roberts 
would be a pro-business Justice. While that debate will no doubt con-
tinue, one thing is clear: it’s been a good decade for business at the 
Roberts Court. And, unfortunately, a good decade for business has 
meant a bad decade for consumers and employees who want to be able 
to hold businesses accountable in court when they violate the law. 
While no one can say for certain what the next decade will hold, it’s 
likely to be more of the same, at least in the near term. 
 
134. Id. at 2488 (“When analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a statute, we 
often apply the two-step framework announced in Chevron . . . .”). 
135. Id. at 2488 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 
120, 159 (2000)). 
136. Id. at 2489 (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 
2444 (2014)). 
137. Conservative Justices on the Court had begun questioning Auer deference, 
as well. See, e.g., Adam White, Scalia and Chevron: Not Drawing Lines, but 
Resolving Tensions, Yale J. Reg.: Notice & Comment (Feb. 23, 2016), 
http://yalejreg.com/nc/scalia-and-chevron-not-drawing-lines-but-
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